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The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian
Policymaker
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci* and Nuno Garoupa **
In this paper, we argue that social decision-making is subject
to a fundamental conflict between consistency and complete-
ness. We show that a consistent welfarist method of policy
assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto prin-
ciple, may be incomplete in the sense that it is incapable of
providing a solution to important social welfare problems.
Legal policy consequences are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economists argue that important, socially relevant decisions, rang-
ing from merger control to adoption, should be informed by a careful
economic analysis. Raising the bar, a prominent view posits that all
social decisions should be based exclusively on welfare economics;
that is, all other considerations about fairness or justice should be
disregarded if they conflict with the maximization of individuals'
welfare.
In this paper, we argue that policymaking is subject to a funda-
mental dilemma, one between consistency and completeness. We
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define consistency to mean the implementation of a set of criteria
for policy assessment without internal contradictions. In particular,
we pay attention to consistency with welfarist evaluation of public
policies and therefore with the Pareto principle. We define complete-
ness' to mean the ability of such a set of criteria to assess all rele-
vant policy issues. Consistency does not imply completeness. To the
contrary, as we will illustrate, these two goals may in fact conflict. In
other words, consistent criteria might not generate a solution to the
problem of choosing between two policy outcomes. This point has
important implications for public policy because often a choice will
have to be made even if welfare economics offers no guidance as to
which outcome should be preferred.
Recent literature has focused on the issue of consistency, mostly
leaving the problem of completeness without discussion2 . In par-
ticular, Kaplow and Shavell show that any non-welfarist method of
policy assessment violates the Pareto principle.3 This result implies
that if policies are chosen according to criteria that are inconsistent
with the welfarist method, the outcome will not maximize social
ICompleteness refers to complete social preferences and should not be confused
with complete individual preferences. Likewise, incompleteness is not to be confused
with Arrow's impossibility, which discusses the mutual incompatibility of five basic
axioms which a social decision rule should reasonably follow. Our analysis is not
restricted by such axioms. Kenneth J. Arrow, Individual Values and Social Choice
(Wiley 1951).
2See, however, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, G6edel, Kaplow, Shavell: Consistency
and Completeness in Social Decision-Making, 79 Chi Kent L Rev 497 (2004) (consid-
ering the debate on completeness vs. consistency in mathematics and logic and its
implications for welfare economics). See Efe A. Ok and Levent Ko&kesen, Negatively
Interdependent Preferences, 17 Social Choice & Welfare 533 (2000) (concerning the
issue of recursivity that will be addressed below in the text). See also Brett McDon-
nel, Economists' New Argument, 88 Minn L Rev 86 (2003) (addressing the issue of
changes in preferences, which will be analyzed later in the text, and noticing that the
choice of the criterion concerning how preferences should be shaped involves non-
welfarist considerations). We argue instead that, even if that criterion were entirely
welfarist, the recursivity of the logical reasoning needed to assess such policies may
ultimately yield no solution to the problem. See also Ward Farnsworth, A Taste for
Fairness, 102 Colum L Rev 1992 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Po-
litical Conflict (Oxford 1996); David A. Hoffman and Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law
and Economics Be Both Practical and Principled, 53 Ala L Rev 335 (2002) (which
examines the problem of completeness from a different perspective from ours, refer-
ring to whether or not economic analysis can be implemented if there is disagreement
concerning its validity. See Walter Kanning and Arnald J. Kanning, Book Review:
L. Kaplow and S. Shavell: Fairness versus Welfare, 21 Social Choice and Welfare
175 (2003) (which briefly mentions the issue of interdependent preferences discussed
further in this article).
3 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assess-
ment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J Polit Econ 281 (2001).
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welfare. Consequently, Kaplow and Shavell call for consistency in
social decision-making.
In our discussion, we take Kaplow and Shavell's viewpoint on con-
sistency but argue that the welfarist method might not provide a
policy assessment when it should. For example, under certain condi-
tions, the welfarist method may be unable to assess non-trivial poli-
cies, such as education or freedom of religion, for example, which
require the aggregation of individual preferences over a social welfare
function. The reason is that, when individuals have preferences over
a certain social welfare function, the problem becomes recursive and
may either admit no solution or an infinite number of solutions.
Therefore, our thesis is not contrary to Kaplow and Shavell's but
rather is complementary to it.
4
In summary, our view is that a consistent welfarist method may be
incomplete in the sense that it is incapable of providing a solution to
important social welfare problems-thus failing to supply effective
policy guidance. If a consistent method is incomplete, a method that
guarantees completeness can only be constructed by implementing
a set of criteria that allows for some internal inconsistency. As a con-
sequence, there is a potential conflict between consistency and com-
pleteness. This potential conflict between consistency and complete-
ness implies that, in many circumstances, social decision-making
cannot solely rest on the welfarist method. A complete, social
decision-making algorithm may have to take into account those fair-
ness values and more generally the non-individualistic determinants
(in the sense of any non-welfarist criterion, as defined in Kaplow and
Shavell), which were rejected at the outset because they were incon-
sistent with the Pareto principle.
Further, we should explain that our article has very little bear-
ing on the controversies generated by Kaplow and Shavell's series
of articles. 6 We do not argue, as some have done, that their analysis
is incorrect! Our claim, instead, is that consistency might come at
'Also note that our argument is not about why or when recursivity exists, but
suggests that recursivity is a limitation to the mathematical formulation of Kaplow
and Shavell's consistency criterion. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus
Welfare (Harvard 2002).
5 1d.
6Kaplow and Shavell make three arguments. First, they argue that deciding policies
on the basis of notions of fairness may violate the Pareto principle. We refer to this point.
The authors further argue that notions of fairness may be used as proxies for the Pareto
principle and that they may have evolved as rules of thumb for the implementation of
the Pareto principle. These arguments are neither discussed nor contested here. Id.
7See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and
the Pareto Principle, 110 Yale L J 173 (2000); Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair
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the price of incompleteness. In fact, there are situations in which the
Paretian method cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the problem
of ranking policies, although it satisfies the requirement of consis-
tency set forth by Kaplow and Shavell.s
We make no claim about whether a consistent Paretian method
should be regarded as the preferable way to assess social policies.
This issue was the main focus of the debate between Posner, endors-
ing the normative use of economics, and Baker, Dworkin, and Kron-
man, opposing this view.9 Kaplow and Shavell address this point and
argue that grounding policymaking in criteria that conflict with the
Pareto principle ultimately reduces social welfare.10 However, the
authors do not systematically prove that the maximization of social
welfare should be the object of policymaking. Rather, their point
on consistency could be applied to any criterion for policymaking.
Ultimately, their point is that given a goal for policymaking, the
means employed to pursue it should be consistent with that goal.
We base our analysis on the assumption that the goal of policymak-
ing is indeed the maximization of social welfare and neither attempt
Paretian, 110 Yale L J 251 (2000). For a response, see Louis, Kaplow and Steven Shavell,
Notions of Fairness versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency,
110 Yale L J 237 (2000). See also Marc Fleurbaey, Bertil Tungodden and Howard F.
Chang, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Prin-
ciple: A Comment, 111 J Pol Econ 1382 (2003). For a reply, see Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto
Principle: A Reply, 112 J Pol Econ 249 (2004). See also Richard Craswell, Kaplow and
Shavell on the Substance of Fairness, 32 J Legal Stud 245 (2003); A. Kornhauser, Prefer-
ences, Well-being, and Morality in Social Decisions, 32 J Legal Stud 303 (2003); Jeremy
Waldron, Locating Distribution, 32 J Legal Stud 277 (2003). For a response, see Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle,
Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J Legal Stud 331 (2003).For a more recent cri-
tique, see Arthur Ripstein, Too Much Invested to Quit, 20 Econ & Phil 185 (2004). For
a reply, see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Notes on Welfarist versus Deontological
Principles, 20 Econ & Phil 209 (2004). See Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on
Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S Cal L Rev 847 (2002).
1 Kaplow and Shavell, 109 J Polit Econ 281 (cited in note 3).
9Endorsing the normative use of economics, see Richard A. Posner, Utilitarian-
ism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J Legal Stud, 103 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
Hofstra L Rev 487 (1980). For an opposing view, see C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of
the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 Phil & Pub Affairs 3 (1975); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is
Wealth a Value? 9 J Legal Stud 191 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximiza-
tion as a Normative Principle, 9 J Legal Stud 227 (1980). For an extensive reference to
this debate, see Kaplow and Shavell, 109 J Polit Econ 281 (cited in note 3).
10Kaplow and Shavell, 32 J Legal Stud 331 (cited in note 7).
11 Daniel Farber. What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity, 101 Mich L
Rev 1791 (2003). See also Dorff, 75 S Cal L Rev 847 (cited in note 7); Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan, Some Sound and Fury from Kaplow and Shavell, 23 L & Phil 73 (2004).
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to prove nor to disprove this starting point. On the contrary, as to the
authors' point on consistency, we believe that our point on complete-
ness also applies more generally and can be extended to any consis-
tent method of policy assessment, even a non-welfarist one.
Some of the contributions following Kaplow and Shavell 2 are par-
ticularly close to ours. Kornhauser makes the point that the aggrega-
tion of preferences may be problematic when people have preferences
over different 'regimes of rights'.1 3 This argument is aimed at unveil-
ing a conflict between potentially inconsistent policy goals. Since
individuals might have mutually conflicting preferences, ensuring
consistency in the system as a whole might ultimately be impos-
sible. This point is different from the issue of completeness that we
discuss. In fact, we show that incompleteness may result in a system
where consistency is guaranteed.
14
Farber emphasizes the fact that the welfarist criterion can be applied
only after a social welfare function has been chosen." This enables
the policymaker to aggregate individuals' welfare in a measure of
social welfare and hence to choose the policy that maximizes social
welfare. Absent a social welfare function, the welfarist criterion can-
not be applied. Contrary to Kaplow and Shavell, Farber argues that
the choice of the social welfare function can be made only by relying
on non-welfarist criteria. Putting it simply, Farber remarks that there
may be the need for a starting point, external to welfare economics
and in which welfarist analysis can be grounded, reminiscent of the
Kelsenian grundnorm. Our point differs in that it applies even if it
were possible to use some meta-function to aggregate individuals'
preferences over the social welfare function to be chosen. The sys-
tem is incomplete not because a social welfare function cannot be
chosen according to the welfarist criterion, but because problems of
recursivity may make it impossible to come to a policy assessment.
The choice of a social welfare function is but one example of the set
of situations in which this problem might occur.
In the next section, we illustrate our point that welfarism is in-
complete for an important class of cases, namely, when recursivity
is important. The example we have in mind is that of a computer
programmed for ranking public policies according to the welfarist
method, thus consistent with the Pareto principle. We ask the com-
12 Kaplow and Shavell, 109 J Polit Econ 281 (cited in note 3).
1 
3 Kornhauser, 32 J Legal Stud 303 (cited in note 7).
14 Our analysis is thus also different from Sen, who shows that the Pareto principle
and liberal ideals may conflict. Our aim is instead to show that, when a set of consis-
tent criteria is used, some relevant problems may remain unresolved. Amartya Sen,
The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J Pol Econ 152 (1970).
'5 Farber, 101 Mich L Rev 1791 (cited in note 11).
122 Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker
puter to choose between policy A and policy B. Kaplow and Shavell's
consistency point is that if we add any non-welfarist constraint into
the computer program, the answer provided by the computer might
violate the Pareto principle. Our remark is that if the computer is pro-
grammed only on the basis of consistent welfarist criteria, it might
return the answer 'unable to choose between policy A and policy B.'
Notice that there is a fundamental difference between incomplete-
ness and indifference. The answer returned by the computer could
be 'I am indifferent between policy A and policy B/ and that is not a
problem for public policy. Such an answer would simply suggest that
the outcomes are equivalent from the point of view of social welfare,
and would not imply that the welfarist method is incomplete. In con-
trast, as we will explain, policies A and B are not equivalent as they
yield different levels of social welfare; nevertheless, the computer is
unable to say which one is to be preferred. If the aggregate welfare of
individuals is to be maximized, adherence to the welfarist method
is not a misguided way to ensure the consistent pursue of Pareto
efficient policies, as argued by many other scholars; rather, it is an
incomplete method.
This example also shows that our point is not about the selec-
tion of a social welfare function; that is, the problem is not to decide
whether the computer program ought to be a welfarist software.
Such a choice points to an endless series of meta-choices of the ulti-
mate criterion to use which in turn would require a series of yet
higher-level computers devoted to solve each of these choices. We
might have a recursive problem in this case, but of a very different
nature from ours. 16 The problem would be the choice of the appropri-
ate computer software and not, as in our model, the choice of a policy
outcome after the computer software has already been implemented.
The implications of our findings for public and legal policy are dis-
cussed at the end of the paper.
II. ANALYSIS
Let x be a complete description of the world and n the number of
individuals, where x = xi,..., x n is a comprehensive account of each
individual's situation. Define X to be the set of all conceivable states
of the world.
From Kaplow and Shavell 7 , we can make the following state-
ments:
16 This is the line of reasoning by Farber, 101 Mich L Rev 1791 (cited in note 11).
"Kaplow and Shavell, 109 J Polit Econ 281 (cited in note 3).
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(1) A social welfare function F is a function from X to the real line ,T.
(2) An individual utility function Ui for each i = 1,..., n is also a
function from X to 91.
(3) An individualistic social welfare function is a social welfare
function of the form F( U,(x),..., Un(x)).
(4) A social welfare function is not individualistic if and only if
there exist x, x' e X such that U,(x)= U,(x') for all i and F(x) * F(x').
(5) The weak Pareto principle is that if, for any states x, x' C X, we
have U.(x)> U(x') for all i= 1,...,n, then F(x)>F(x').
(6) If a social welfare function ascribes weight to some factor inde-
pendently of its effect on individuals' utilities in a non-individualistic
way, then that social welfare function violates the Pareto principle.I8
Therefore, we now have a consistent method to evaluate policies
and that respects the Pareto principle. Any method that does not
respect a welfarist approach violates the Pareto principle.
Suppose now that F is of the form F(U,(x),..., Un(x)) and U.:--,s is
of the form U.(x, F(.)) for all i= 1,...,n. Following the reasoning of Berg-
strom 9 , Ui is an interdependent utility function such that individual
i's preferences depend on his own situation but also on societal wel-
fare.2 Then for any state of the world x it must be true that F = F( U.
(x, F(.)). We are interested in whether a system of interdependent pref-
erences resolved by private subutility of x and interdependent social
welfare determines a corresponding system of independent utility
functions V:--9i and an independent social welfare function G(x).
Unfortunately, a general answer to recursive social welfare functions
is not easy to find.2 1 Notice that if such an independent social welfare
function exists, we have consistency (with the Pareto principle) and
completeness. Our point is of course that such a function might not
exist. Therefore, although we have consistency, we do not have com-
pleteness (because it will not provide us with a complete ranking of
social outcomes).
2
"Proof in Kaplow and Shavell, 109 J Polit Econ 281 (cited in note 3).
"9Theodore C. Bergstrom, Systems of Benevolent Utility Functions, 1 J Pub Econ
Theory 71 (1999).
20The original terminology derives from Pollak. Robert A. Pollak, Interdependent
Preferences, 66 Am Econ Rev 309 (1976). Bergstrom studies interdependent utilities
when individual A cares for individual B and vice-versa, and not social preferences.
Bergrstrom, 1 J Pub Econ Theory 71 (cited in note 19)
2 'Bergrstrom, 1 J Pub Econ Theory 71 (cited in note 19); Yann Bramoull6, Interde-
pendent Utilities, Preference Indeterminacy, and Social Networks, U Md (unpub-
lished manuscript 2001).
2 Although it is possible that Kaplow and Shavell's mathematical formulation
refers to independent utilities, it does not exclude inter-dependent utilities. Kaplow
and Shavell, 109 J Polit Econ 281 (cited in note 3).
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As an illustration, assume that U(.)--.J is an interdependent util-
ity with an additively separable form (a Bergstrom-interdependent
utility function):
U1(x,F(.)) = ui(x) + ctF(.) (1)
where u,(x) is the private subutility of x satisfying the usual assump-
tions and a .is constant and exogenous.23
Let us also assume that social welfare is a weighted utilitarian
function, such that:
n n n
F - P,U,(.)= Zp1 u,(x) + F(.)ZI P1
/ = i= (2)
where ) is exogenous.2 4
The independent social welfare satisfies Kaplow and Shavell's
mathematical conditions and can be derived as:
n
u(x), u(x)) -  n (3)
The independent utility function of individual i is given by:
n n n (x
E 3,ui(x) E1-Z13,ajj~x
V(x) = ui(x) + i , -- i ui(x) + a ,.1 (4)
ji(X
There are three possible situations to be considered:
(1) En ,ix. < 1: there is a unique solution to the problem of find-
ing an independent social welfare function. This corresponds
to the usual assumption taken in the altruism literature.
25
This is a situation where welfarism is consistent and com-
plete.
nPreferences can be positively interdependent or negatively interdependent. See
Ok and Korkesen, 17 Social Choice & Welfare 533 (cited in note 2). We do not impose
any restriction on the sign of ai.
24 The indeterminacy problem discussed by Farber is with respect to 3, for j= 1 to n.
Notice once again that our quest is different from that paper, since in our analysis i is
well-definedbut exogenously determined. Farber, 101 Mich L Rev 1791 (cited in note 7).
2
1 Gary Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J Polit Econ 1063 (1974); D. Bern-
heim and 0. Stark, Altruism Within the Family Reconsidered: Do Nice Guys Fin-
ish Last?, 78 Am Econ Rev 1034 (1988); Bergstrom, 1 J Pub Econ Theory 71 (cited in
note 19); Roger Bowles and Nuno Garoupa, Household Dissolution, Child Care and
Divorce Law, 22 Intl Rev L & Econ 495 (2002).
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(2) n= , 3ct > 1: the solution we have derived is unstable. Accord-
ing to Bramoull6, the reasonable economic interpretation of
instability should be that there is an infinite solution set to
the problem of finding an independent social welfare func-
tion. A related interpretation is discussed by Postlewaite.
2 6
Nevertheless it is not the case that all solutions yield the
same level of social welfare. Clearly other social criteria are
required to help a welfarist analysis in this situation since
policymaking requires a choice and the implementation of a
determined policy.
(3)E. .[.ot. = 1: there is no solution to the problem of finding
an independent social welfare function. A welfarist analysis
in this situation does not identify the optimal policy, and
yet policymaking requires that some policy is chosen and
implemented.
Hence, from this example, it is clear that if we live in a world
described by (2) or (3) a welfare analysis is consistent but incomplete.
Notice that imposing restrictions on the parameters to make sure
we are in (1) is not an acceptable solution since these are exogenous
parameters determined by individual preferences and the available
mechanisms to determine a specific social welfare function. In fact,
ad-hoc restrictions would be non-welfarist and therefore inconsis-
tent."
III. IMPLICATIONS
Kaplow and Shavell argue that policies should be chosen according to
the welfarist criterion and also suggest that, when individual prefer-
ences depend on policies, the most desirable policy can be found by
means of the welfarist analysis. 28 We have argued that this may not be
the case, because a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment
may be incomplete, that is, unable to provide answers to important
policy issues, such as the aggregation of individual preferences in a
social welfare function and the way policies shape preferences. It is
not our claim that the welfarist method is always incomplete but
2 6Andrew Postlewaite, The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences, 42 Eur Econ
Rev 779 (1998). Notice also that the literature (Becker, Bernheim and Stark) discard
this possibility because the independent utility function is decreasing in consump-
tion. Becker, 82 J Polit Econ 1063 (cited in note 25); Bernheim and Stark, 78 Am Econ
Rev 1034 (cited in note 25).
27
1t would be as arguing that because we want consistency and completeness we
can only live in world (1).
2 Kaplow and Shavell, 32 J Legal Stud at 413-18 (cited in note 7).
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rather than it will be incomplete for a subgroup of possible but impor-
tant cases.
We believe that many policy areas, in particular legal policy, are
characterized by this problem as a consequence of, for example,
recursivity. These issues include questions concerning equality, lib-
erty, distribution of resources, multicultural integration, education
of youth, and re-education of criminals.
Our viewpoint is that trying to solve these problems by use of the
welfarist method may lead to a circular and therefore inconclusive
reasoning. It is evident that society cannot generally afford to let
such fundamental questions go unanswered. The only way out is
resorting to precisely those criteria that give independent weight to
values other than individual welfare, that is, precisely those criteria
that are considered notions of fairness in Kaplow and Shavell's anal-
ysis. Eventually a non-welfarist method might have to be used when
a consistent welfarist method is unable to provide an answer.
